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ARTICLES
A LIBERAL COMMUNITARIAN
CONCEPTION OF PRIVACY
AMITAI ETZIONI*
ABSTRACT
In a large and complex society, anti-social behavior cannot be restrained by government intervention alone—without it becoming a police
state. Informal social controls are necessary to keep deviance from societal norms and values at a socially acceptable level, and one of the levers
of this social pressure is the observation of and reaction to the personal
conduct of members of one’s community. This article argues that in several areas of contemporary American life decreasing privacy by strengthening informal social controls will lessen the need for state surveillance
and regulation, which tends to be act with a heavier hand and is more
invasive than its informal counterpart.
This article1 suggests that in the contemporary American context:
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* University Professor and Director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies at The George Washington University.
1. The author is indebted to Ashley McKinless for research assistance and to Erin
Syring, Jeff Gianattasio, and Chris Slobogin for commentaries on a previous draft. He also
benefited from discussion with Orin Kerr. The article draws on previous work of the author, including AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY (Basic Books 2000); Amitai Etzioni,
Implications of Select New Technologies For Individual Rights and Public Safety, HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 15.2 258-290 (2002); Amitai Etzioni, Children and Free Speech, in The Common Good (Polity Press 2004), at 56-94; Amitai Etzioni, The Privacy Merchants: What Is To
Be Done?, U. PA. J. CONST. L. 14.4 (2012).
2. Privacy issues have taken the center stage in recent years due to a confluence of
factors, including widespread adoption of the Internet, social media and mobile phones, as
well as economic incentives for companies to monetize consumer information. See Nicole A.
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(a) Increased protection of social privacy will lead to more government
scrutiny. Hence, when one seeks to regulate social media in order to
better protect privacy, one ought to take into account that such regulation is likely to undermine informal social controls, which in turn
will lead to greater government surveillance and intrusion.2 Parents, colleges, and the community in general should be accorded a
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relatively high level of access to information about personal conduct.
See Part I.
(b) “The expectation of privacy” as a foundation for legal rulings and
public policy should be allowed to fade away, and determining what
constitutes a reasonable standard of privacy should draw on four
explicit criteria. Accordingly, before limiting the scope of privacy,
courts and policy makers should consider:
i. The import of challenges to core values;
ii. The availability of voluntary means to cope with these challenges;
iii. Ways to minimize the intrusion if one is deemed necessary; and
iv. Attention to unanticipated consequences. (This might be called a
social policy model but it has clear foundations in the constitution.)
See Part II.
(c) If a free society can tolerate more surveillance, the greater is the
surveillance of surveillance. The more government agencies are subject to oversight and their agents are accountable, including to those
higher in rank, the legislature, and to the public, the more leeway
they can be accorded. See Part III for a new mechanism for public
oversight.
(d) Sensitive information should be better protected than insensitive
information, and the use of insensitive information to ferret out that
which is more sensitive should be treated as akin to mining sensitive information. See Part IV.

I. INTRODUCTION
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Ozer, Putting Online Privacy Above the Fold: Building a Social Movement and Creating
Corporate Change, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215, 233 (2012).
3. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE: COMMUNITY AND MORALITY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (Basic Books 1996).
4. E.J. DIONNE, OUR DIVIDED POLITICAL HEART: THE BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAN IDEA
IN AN AGE OF DISCONTENT (Bloomsbury USA 2013).
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A liberal communtarian conception of privacy starts by taking for
granted that citizens face two or more fully legitimate concerns (or conceptions of utility), and hence citizens should not a priori privilege any.
High among these concerns is the protection of individual rights and of
the common good. In the following discussion, the focus is on one right –
the right for privacy – and two categories of the common good—the moral
order (to be defined shortly) and homeland security. Indeed, the particular kind of communitarianism here followed is referred to as liberal because it combines concerns pertaining to individual rights with those for
the common good.3 This social philosophy is reflected in the American
Constitution in the references to both individual rights and the general
welfare, and in the age-long dialogue between Jeffersonian and
Hamiltonian theories of government.4
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This liberal communitarian approach differs from those approaches
which strongly advocate for individuals’ rights in general, particularly
privacy rights, set a very high bar that must be cleared before rights can
be limited, and put the onus of proof on those who seek such concessions.5 The liberal comunitarian approach also parts from those who
hold that security must be protected and when needs conflict with rights,
security should be privileged. Authoritarian communities and East
Asian communitarians tend to be concerned with either the common
good or rights to the extent that the rights are upheld to serve the
rulers.6
The text of the Fourth Amendment reflects this liberal communitarian approach. Unlike the absolute language of the First Amendment
(“Congress shall make no law. . .”), the Fourth Amendment bans only
unreasonable search, and thus, on the face of it, recognizes a whole category of searches that are reasonable. Often, they are reasonable because
they serve the common good (or, the public interest).7
II. IT TAKES A VILLAGE TO PREVENT A CRIME:
THE HYDRAULIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL PRIVACY
AND GOVERNMENT SCRUTINY
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5. ACLU, Keep America Safe and Free, http://www.aclu.org/key-issues.
6. Russell A. Fox, Confucian and Communitarian Responses to Liberal Democracy, 59
REV. OF POL. 561 (1997); Joseph Chan, A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Joanne R. Bauer &
Daniel A. Bell eds. 1999), at 212.
7. This approach presumes that one can define the common good and measure it, and
that the issue is more than dealing merely with a clash of a large number of private interests, a subject not further explored here. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE COMMON GOOD (Polity
Press 2004); AMITAI ETZIONI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE: COMMUNITY AND MORALITY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (Basic Books 1996).
8. For a discussion of the legal implications of strong or weak informal social controls,
see James S. Coleman, The Creation and Destruction of Social Capital: Implications for the
Law, 3 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 375, 392 (1988) (Coleman defines “social
capital” as the social organizations, such as the family, school, and community, that facilitate the provision of public goods, including “social norms and sanctions that enforce
them”).
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The moral order of a community is based on two elements. The first
is the community’s moral culture, which is a set of shared values to
which the community members subscribe and which are specified into
behavioral norms of do’s and do not’s. The second is a set of informal
social controls that reward those who heed the norms and penalize those
who violate the norms. The stronger the moral order, there exists less of
a need for policing, courts, jails, and all of the associated economic and
human costs of coercive control by the government.8 To put it the other
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9. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
10. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
11. For a critique of the public/private distinction as related to domestic abuse, see
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991); see also
KRISTIN A. KELLY, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY (Cornell University
Press 2002).
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way around, crime and punishment are indicators of communal failure,
of a weak moral order, and weak informal controls.
For the moral order to function, privacy must be limited. Privacy
must be limited because in order to activate informal social controls,
members of the community must be aware that anti-social behavior is
occurring. To proceed, we must introduce/operate under a sociological
definition of privacy: privacy is a societal license to keep some areas of
one’s behavior, emotions, and thought invisible and inaudible, and thus
free from communal surveillance and control.
To illustrate, the following is a relatively simple example of a community’s moral order. One can add a chemical to the waters of a swimming pool that will produce a blue cloud around individuals who relieve
themselves in the pool. There is no sociological study to prove the effectiveness of this chemical; however, the possibility of this anti-social behavior, once private, becoming public should diminish the occurrence of
this behavior, without drawing on law enforcement.
There is also the tendency to assume that whatever takes place in
one’s private space should be granted privacy protection, the idea that
“my home is my castle.” Much of the literature on privacy and legal cases
concerns the boundaries of this private space, as highlighted by Katz v.
United States,9 Kyllo v. United States,10 and various cases concerning
searches of one’s car or luggage. However, another view has expressed
that even though spousal abuse seems to occur within the confines of a
person’s home, concerns for privacy should not stop the community from
investigating such conduct.11 One may say that when such suspicions
arise, the authorities can be notified and a warrant granted by the courts
to investigate the matter. However, the community can intervene legitimately before there is enough evidence to permit the involvement of law
enforcement. If the community feels freer to ask spouses about their conditions (say if bruises are visible or screams emanate from their homes)
and to censure members of the community who are held to be abusive,
there will be less spousal abuse and less need for government action.
This is possible because in contemporary liberal democratic societies
the punishments of informal social control are as a rule relatively light,
and hence if they are excessively activated – the harm is limited. At the
same time, informal social control often prevents misconduct from escalating into a crime. Most people will choose to “behave” rather than face
the censure of their community, as long as they are members of such
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communities that have pro-social norms. The opposite effect would hold
true in traditional or authoritarian societies, such as North Korea and
Saudi Arabia, and in those societies in which social pressures are as
overwhelming as they are in many parts of Japan.12 In these societies
informal controls are excessive so the scopes of invisible behavior and
privacy are more expansive.
A. PARENTAL SURVEILLANCE

OF

MINORS

C M
Y K

08/13/2013 08:57:11

12. CHIE MUROGA JEX, SOCIAL CONFORMITY AND NATIONALISM IN JAPAN: A PERSPECTIVE
JAPANESE EXPERTISE (LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing 2011).
13. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Expresses Concerns on Rating Scheme; Says ‘Voluntary’ System is Gov’t-Backed Censorship (Feb. 29, 1996) http://
www.aclu.org/news/n022996b.html; see Paul Farhi, FCC Set to Back V-Chip, WASH. POST,
Mar. 6, 1998, at G03.
14. Jack M. Balkin, Media Filters, The V-Chip and the Foundations of Broadcast Regulation, 45 Duke L. J. 1133 (1996).

FROM
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Informal social controls suffer when minors are treated as individuals
with strong rights or privacy against their parents, as some civil libertarians and librarians hold. From a communitarian viewpoint, parents and
children are members of a small community (the family) and the parents
are agents of more extended communities, responsible for the social conduct of their children. Although children are to be viewed as accumulating more rights as they grow older, in principle, the default position
ought to be—in order for the moral order to work and the role of the state
to be limited—that parents have not merely a right but a duty to monitor
the behavior of their children. As new technologies make it easier for
children to conceal their behavior, the moral order is served when the
parents also take advantage of technological advances in order to discharge their parental responsibilities.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 required new televisions to include a V-chip that allows users to block all programming that carries a
particular rating. The rating system was created and voluntarily
adopted by the television industry, and the blocking can only be activated by individuals who choose if and how to use their V-chip. Nevertheless some civil libertarians objected, calling the system “governmentbacked censorship” that would “empower bureaucrats and television executives to make decisions for parents.”13 One legal scholar wrote that
the V-chip “raises the possibility that in the Information Age, control of
filters may be one of the most important forms of power over human
thought and expression. In the Information Age, the informational filter,
not information itself, is king.”14 There are similar developments online
including software such as “NetSnitch” and “NetNanny” that allow parents to monitor (though not block) what websites their children visit.
Marc Rotenberg of the Electronic Information Privacy Center com-
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mented that this “[s]ounds like Orwellian parenting. . .you might as well
drop a video camera in your kid’s bedroom.”15
Such objections to protective measures for minors of all ages are
problematic on two grounds. First, there is a need to consider age-gradations.16 Minors, especially younger ones, have not yet developed basic
moral values or rational decision-making capabilities—both of which are
relevant in determining what rights they should be afforded. Second,
parents and educators have a social and moral duty to shape the cultural
environment in which children develop, a duty that cannot be fulfilled if
they are unable to monitor what is exposed to their minor children. If in
the name of protecting the privacy of minors, parents are hobbled in discharging their duties, the state will end up with having to deal with
more minors, and later adults, who engage in anti-social behavior.
B. COLLEGE STUDENTS
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15. New Software Tracks Kids on Internet Without Blocking Sites, AUGUSTA CHRON.,
Aug. 4, 1997, http://chronicle.augusta.com/stories/1997/08/04/tec_212418.shtml.
16. The treatment pediatric patient privacy and consent provides an example of maturity and age-graded privacy considerations. The “mature minor doctrine” allows courts to
take into weigh factors such as age, education, and perceived judgment capacity when deciding the degree of medical privacy afforded to a minor vis-à-vis their parents. Amy L.
McGuire & Courtenay R. Bruce, Keeping Children’s Secrets: Confidentiality in the Physician-Patient Relationship, 8 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 315, 333 (2009) (“In deciding on a
general policy regarding patient confidentiality, physicians ought to consider, weigh and
prioritize the patient’s developing autonomy and level of maturity, the importance of trust
in the therapeutic relationship, the family dynamics, respect for the parent-child relationship and the parents’ right to rear their child as the deem appropriate”).
17. Elizabeth Bernstein, Colleges Move Boldly on Student Drinking, WALL ST. J., Dec.
6, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119690910535115405.html?mod=hpp_us_editors_
picks.
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When minors become legal adults and attend college, their privacy
rights against their parents are much stronger than those of minority
age. Still, there are situations in which the moral order would benefit
and government policing could be reduced if the parents received more
information from the colleges about their children-students’ record and
conduct.
Colleges used to act in loco parentis. However, as of the 1960s they
greatly curtailed this role. At the same time, they also increased the privacy protection of the students not so much from the state, but rather
against their parents. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(FERPA) of 1974 limited the educational information that schools can
share with parents. FERPA has prevented colleges from reporting
troubling signs, such as signs of substance-abuse and mental disturbance, to parents.17 FERPA was amended in 1998 to allow for (though
not require) parental notification when a student violates the school’s
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drinking and drug policy.18 Recently, the shooting of students by other
students, for example at Virginia Tech in 2005, has further pushed colleges to realize that family ties and roles do not stop when a child ceases
to legally be a minor and enrolls in a college. As the preceding analysis
suggests, colleges are now making it more possible for parents to act as
agents of informal social controls.19
These changes in policies are not without controversy.20 The new
laws, regulations and college policies should be amended to enable students to appeal to the school to not share information with their families
if the students can show that such notification may cause harm to the
students. On the contrary, the more families can be mobilized to help
curb anti-social behavior, the less colleges will have to draw on public
authorities to curb student anti-social behavor, unless they themselves
are inclined to return to serve in loco parentis.
C. TRACKING RENTAL CARS
As will become clear below, there are many areas in which the privacy of customers and employees should be better protected from corporate surveillance. However, there are situations in which new informal
controls by corporations do serve the common good and reduce the need
for governmental coercive controls. One case in point is the GPS devices
that many car rental companies install in their vehicles. This technology
allows the car rental companies to locate stolen or lost vehicles, provide
roadside or emergency assistance, and track where and how fast renters
drive. Acme Rental tracked renters’ speed and charged them $150.00

08/13/2013 08:57:11
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18. Some argue that the emergency exception included in FERPA is too narrowly defined leading schools to “default to the nondisclosure option rather than disclosing information to third parties, such as parents, when students threaten to harm themselves or
others.” She notes that Congress and the Courts have the ability to correct this as societal
attitudes about safety and privacy shift—as evidenced by the changes made to FERPA to
notify parents about illegal substance use. See Stephanie Humphries, Institutes of Higher
Education, Safety Swords, and Privacy Shields: Reconciling FERPA and the Common Law,
35 J.C. & U.L. 145 (2008).
19. For a study on the impact of the passage of the Higher Education Amendments of
1998, which amended the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 to make it
easier for colleges and universities to notify parents when their student broke institutional
policies or drug and alcohol rules, see John W. Lowery, Carolyn J. Palmer & Donald D.
Gehring, Policies and Practices of Parental Notification for Student Alcohol Violations, 42
NASPA J. 415 (2004) (stating before the 1998 amendment, 13.8% of the institutions in the
study had formal written parental notification policies; in 2002, 45.8% reported to have
one).
20. For more discussion on policy changes, see William DeJong, Discouraging Mischief:
Using Environmental Management to Curb High-Risk Drinking, PREVENTION FILE: 14 ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, AND OTHER DRUGS (1999); see also John W. Lowery, Carolyn J. Palmer &
Donald G. Gehring, Policies and Practices of Parental Notification for Student Alcohol Violations, 42 NAPSA J. 4 (2004).
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21. Anita Ramasastry, Tracking Every Move You Make: Can Car Rental Companies
Use Technology to Monitor Our Driving? A Connecticut Court’s Ruling Highlights an Important Question, FINDLAW (Aug. 23, 2005), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20
050823.html.
22. Robert Lemos, Car Spy Pushes Privacy Limit, ZDNET (Jun. 20, 2001), at http://
www.zdnet.com/news/car-spy-pushes-privacy-limit/116132.
23. David Wichner, Rental Car Tracking Results in Lawsuit, RENSE.COM, http://rense.
com/general26/rentalcarsatellite.htm.
24. John Schwartz, This Car Can Talk. And What It Says May Cause Concern, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 29, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/29/business/this-car-can-talkwhat-it-says-may-cause-concern.html?pagewanted=4&src=pm.
25. Stephen Ansolabehere & John Lovett, Measuring the Political Consequences of Residential Mobility (CCES Working Paper Series 2008).
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every time they exceeded the speed limit by a certain amount for over
two minutes. The company was sued and the Connecticut Supreme
Court found that the fee was excessive, but not that the GPS tracking
was unlawful.21
Speaking about the case, Richard Smith of the Privacy Foundation
states that “giving out speeding tickets is the job of the police, not of
private industry.”22 He does not explain why limiting dangerous driving
is more justified when done by the government than by those whose vehicles are involved. David Sobel, general counsel of the Electronic Privacy
Information Center, adds the concern that driving records saved by
rental companies could be accessed by lawyers and police.23 As speeding
is illegal, what is the reason such records should not be available? Aviel
D. Rubin, the technical director of the Information Security Institute at
Johns Hopkins University, goes a step further, arguing, “[t]he only way
to get real privacy is not to collect the information in the first place.”24
This is the kind of one-sided advocacy that communitarians seek to
avoid. Encouraging drivers to drive safely is for the common good, and as
long as drivers are informed of corporate controls, they can readily take
their business elsewhere if they find these controls too intrusive. They
can hardly do so to avoid government controls.
So far this Article has showed that allowing informal social control
to work by limiting social privacy is preferable to government surveillance as a way to control anti-social behavior. However, this of course
does not mean that peeping toms should be encouraged or that people
should be free to spy on each other. The question hence arises as to
which matters are to be left private in the social context?
One answer is given that in contemporary America, people chose
which communities to live in—the average American moves once every
five years—the level of privacy can vary by setting to meet different preferences.25 Some communities afford less privacy and more informal order versus other communities that have the opposite profile. People may
choose to join groups such as Alcoholic Anonymous, in which significant
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D. VIRTUAL COMMUNITY ERSATZ
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In earlier eras, when people lived in small communities, visibility
was readily attained and social controls were regularly activated. With
modernity, as communities grew in size and geographic mobility vastly
increased, a great deal of visibility was lost and social controls were considerably weakened. Some sociologists hold that modern men and women lead an atomized life, bereft of social bonds, and hence, tend to
engage in a high level of anti-social behavior that can be restrained
solely by the state.
Actually, communities, albeit in a much attenuated form, can be
found in many parts of modern societies. These include immediate and
extended families, social bonds shared among those of the same ethnic or
racial background (e.g. Chinatown, Spanish Harlem), those sharing in
sexual orientation (e.g. Castro in San Francisco), vocation (e.g. academic

33835-sft_29-3 Sheet No. 77 Side A

disclosure is demanded precisely in order to enhance informal social controls. Others who hold privacy more dearly may well prefer to live in a
city, especially in high-rise buildings in which anonymity and privacy
are more readily available. Still, others may labor to decrease controls in
their communities and increase privacy, e.g., by changing the rules of
their residential association. True, because of economic and social conditions, the geographic mobility of some people is rather limited; they must
stay where they can earn a livelihood. Still, they have a measure of
choice, whether to keep largely to themselves or be more socially engaged
which often entails less privacy.
In short, in civil society people are relatively free to choose the balance between moral order and privacy they prefer. And they can engage
more in communities whose moral order promotes those values that they
share. (Reference is to informal social controls, not to formal, governmental controls.) However they cannot avoid the sociological laws of gravity:
moral order rests in part on visibility of disapproved behavior, and ipso
facto entails limiting privacy.
In addition, informal social controls are essential because the volume of transactions in a modern society is so large that there never can
be enough accountants, inspectors, border guards, custom officials, and
police to limit anti-social behavior to a level a free society can tolerate.
Moreover, these official enforcers themselves need to be policed, as has
long been captured in the refrain, Who Will Guard the Guardians?
Hence, the only way a desired level of civility can be attained is if: (a) a
large number of the members of society (including the law enforcement
personnel) will “behave” because they believe that it is their civil or
moral duty; and (b) a good part of the enforcement will be left to informal
social controls which draw on limited privacy.
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communities), and many others. And virtual communities supplement
off-line interaction and are also able to form communities in their own
right, complete with strong relationships among members.26 Moreover,
virtual communities have developed moral norms, such as principles of
generalized reciprocity and assistance.27
Even in contexts of anonymity, which hinders social controls, virtual
communities have developed tools that help enforce social norms. Informal social control by social exclusion is practiced to limit “flaming,” the
practice of posting or sending insults or inflammatory messages on the
Internet.28
On Reddit, a social news website, users post Internet links and vote
to indicate “like” or “dislike,” which decides what content is displayed on
the site.29 Thus, if a user shares content that others find offensive, the
virtual community has the tools to discourage them. The popular auction
site, eBay, utilizes a rating system in which negative and positive reviews are aggregated and linked to a specific username, and users can
respond to feedback they receive if they believe that it was unfair.30 A
study of this reputational system finds that these systems are effective
at minimizing fraud. For example, 99.99% of eBay auctions occur without problems.31 That is, even if the offline identity of the parties is not
known, informal reputational systems can be quite effective, as long as
behavior is visible to the community.

27. Barry Wellman & Milena Gulia, Net Surfers Don’t Ride Alone: Virtual Communities as Communities, (1997), http://groups.chass.utoronto.ca/netlab/wp-content/uploads/
2012/05/Net-Surfers-Dont-Ride-Alone-Virtual-Community-as-Community.pdf; Lorne Tepperman & James Curtis, Social Problems of the Future, 8 J. FUTURES STUD. 21 (2003),
http://www.jfs.tku.edu.tw/8-1/A03.pdf; Victoria Jobling, Anonymity: The Default for CyberBullies on Social Networks, at http://networkconference.netstudies.org/2011/04/anonymitythe-default-identity-for-cyber-bullies-on-social-networks/.
28. David S. Wall & Matthew Williams, Policing Diversity in Virtual Communities,
CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST., 2007, at 391.
29. http://www.reddit.com/.
30. Paul Resnick et al., The Value of Reputation on eBay: A Controlled Experiment,
EXPERIMENTAL ECON., 2006, at 80.
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31. Peter Kollock, The Production of Trust in Online Markets, (1999), http://www.connectedaction.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/1999-peter-kollock-the-production-of-trustin-online-markets.htm; see also Sara Bartlett, Trust Me! I’m on eBay, at http://networkconference.netstudies.org/2011/04/trust-me-im-on-ebay/.
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26. Paul DiMaggio, Eszter Hargittai, W. Russell Neuman, & John P. Robinson, Social
Implications of the Internet, 27 ANN. REV. SOCIOLOGY 307 (2001); Dietland Stolle, Trusting
Strangers – The Concept of Generalized Trust in Perspective, ÖZP (2002), http://www.oezp.
at/pdfs/2002-4-02.pdf; Amitai Etzioni & Oren Etzioni, Face-to-Face and Computer-Mediated Communities, A Comparative Analysis, 15 INFO. SOC’Y 241 (1999); Gustave S. Mesch &
Ilan Talmud, Online Friendship Formation, Communication Channels, and Social Closeness, INT’L J. INTERNET SCI., 2006, at 29.
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At the same time, there is little reason to doubt that informal social
controls work best in the virtual world where one’s virtual identity is
connected to one’s actual identity. Hence the importance of Facebook,
which is used by more people than any other social media and requires
participants to provide their “real” offline identity. Much has been made,
quite properly, of the fact that people, especially young ones, post on
Facebook (and elsewhere) much information on the assumption that it
will be available only to select friends (low visibility, and hence relatively
private), or without considering the privacy issue, or misunderstanding
or misusing the complicated privacy protection measures Facebook and
other sites provide.32 Various harms are reported to follow and various
changes have been made to better protect privacy in the virtual world.33
Much less attention is paid to the fact that, as a result, the virtual
world has acquired more of the capacities typically possessed by offline
communities to control anti-social behavior. When information on
Facebook can affect one’s ability to attain employment, gain admittance
to college, run for public office, or be well regarded in their community—
users are deterred from acting inappropriately, which would be much
less the case if there was more anonymity. A minor esoteric example of
the ways social controls work in the virtual world is found in the case of a
married woman who accepted a “friend request” from a woman, only to
discover from online pictures of her new friend that they in fact shared
the same adulterous husband.34 Many college admissions offices look at
applicants’ Facebook as part of the decision making process. Thomas
Griffin, director of undergraduate admissions at North Carolina State
University, told the Wall Street Journal that, “several applicants a year
have been rejected in part because of information on social-networking
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32. For a comprehensive analysis privacy concerns surrounding Facebook, including
relevant law and policy, see James Grimmelman, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137
(2009) (suggesting that three social imperatives—identity, relationships, and community—
the lead people to engage in online social networks despite the risks to privacy this entails.
It is essential to understand such social motivations in order to craft successful policies to
protect users’ privacy on sites such as Facebook); see also Peter Swire, Social Networks,
Privacy, and Freedom of Association: Data Protection vs. Data Empowerment, 90 N. CAR. L.
REV. 109 (2012) (discussing points to “substantial public concerns about privacy and social
networks, growing policy discussions about possible regulatory limits, and increased enforcement actions).
33. Cecilia Kang, Facebook Settles FTC Privacy Complaint, Agrees to Ask Users’ Permission for Changes, WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/facebook-settles-ftc-privacy-complaint-agrees-to-ask-users-permission-forchanges/2011/11/29/gIQAqyJC9N story.html; Barbara Ortutay, Facebook Takes Steps to
Address Privacy Concerns, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/huff-wires/20120323/us-tec-facebook-privacy/.
34. Manual Valdes, Facebook “Friend” Request Exposes Man’s Other Wife, PITTSBURG
POST-GAZETTE (May 9, 2012), http://www.postgazette.com/stories/news/us/facebook-friendrequest-exposes-mans-other-wife-221701/.
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sites.”35
One may suggest that people will not improve their behavior but
simply cease posting photos from their drunken parties or inflammatory
texts on their Facebook account. However, they cannot prevent “friends”
from posting group photos or texts. And the fact that people are willing
to pay companies to scrub the Internet to preserve their reputation
shows that they do in fact care.36
Anonymity is a form of privacy because it reduces visibility, which—
to reiterate—is essential for ensuring political dissent, innovation, and
individualization. However, given that most virtual forums of dialogue
and interaction allow people to use an alias, anonymity has led to much
more polarized, coarse, uncivil social platforms, often riddled with racist,
sexist, homophobic and xenophobic expressions. Indeed, in the virtual
world these forms of interaction dominate. By providing many more opportunities for validated identity interactions, the virtual world can be
moved closer to the communal virtues of the real world and norms of
more civil discourse will be encouraged. These observations should give a
pause to those who promote more automatic (as distinct from opt in) privacy controls in those few social media that require disclosed identity. A
nudge toward civility is called for here.
In short, virtual communities can and do provide some of the elements of “real” communities such as the informal social controls that
limit the role of the state.37 However, in this virtual realm these controls
also require visibility and hence limit users’ privacy. The controls seem
to work best when people’s identities online are connected to their offline
identities.

So far this article has briefly visited several examples in which making more room for visibility in the social realm is expected to support the
moral order and reduce the need for governmental coercive controls. In
some other cases, public authorities can activate these controls or
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35. John Hechinger, College Applicants, Beware: Your Facebook Page Is Showing,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB122170459104151023.html.
36. An example of such a company is Reputation.com, http://www.reputation.com.
37. Others have made the case for the use of informal social control, “peer governance,”
as opposed to centralized regulatory systems, to prevent disruptive behavior on the Internet. “[A]llowing each individual to make his or her own decisions. . .regarding when and
with who to connect” would enable “private parties to protect themselves against whatever
they consider to be antisocial activity,” without sacrificing “an Internet that reflects and
tolerates diverse values.” David R. Johnson, Susan P. Crawford, & John G. Palfrey, Jr., The
Accountable Internet: Peer Production of Internet Governance, 9 VA. J. L. & TECH. 9, 15
(2004).
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strengthen them, thus using the law to minimize the use of the law.
Some brief examples follow:
A. SHAMING
Those convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol in Fort
Bend County, Texas were required to place “DUI” bumper stickers on
their cars.38 Another judge ordered a woman convicted of purchasing
controlled substance in front of her children to place a notice in the local
newspaper detailing her offense.39 A man was ordered to place an ad in
his local newspaper, accompanied by his photo, reading, “I am Stephen
Germershausen . . . I was convicted of child molestation . . . If you are a
child molester, get professional help immediately, or you may find your
picture and name in the paper.”40
Such shaming was criticized by the ACLU which protested that
“gratuitous humiliation of the individual serves no societal purpose at all
. . . and there’s been no research to suggest it has been effective in reducing crime.“41 In his dissent in United States v. Gementera,42 a case which
upheld the legality of requiring an offender to wear a sign that specified
his crime while doing community service, Justice Hawkins argued that
“[w]hen one shames another person, the goal is to . . . dehumanize him.
To affirm the imposition of such punishments recalls a time in our history when pillories and stocks were the order of the day.”43
Such criticisms do not take into account that if one assumes that the
offenses at issue cannot be simply ignored (none of the critics suggested
better ways of dealing with them), the main alternative is to jail the offenders. This involves shaming in addition to the loss of liberty and the
attending public and social costs. In short, shaming, which activates in-
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38. Dan M. Kahan, What do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 635
(1996), cited in Sentencing Lawbreakers to a Dose of Shame, CIVIC RENEWAL (CQ Researcher), Mar. 21, 1997, at 252.
39. Jan Hoffman, Crime and Punishment: Shame Gains Popularity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
16, 1997, at A1, cited in Sentencing Lawbreakers to a Dose of Shame, CIVIC RENEWAL (CQ
Researcher), Mar. 21, 1997, at 252.
40. Toni M. Mossaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1880 (1991); see ANNE MARIE MCALINDEN, THE SHAMING OF SEXUAL OFFENDERS: RISK, REDISTRIBUTION AND REINTEGRATION at 42, 165 (Hart Publishing 2007).
41. Tony Allen-Mills, American Criminals Sentenced to Shame, SUNDAY TIMES, Apr.
20, 1997.
42. United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2004).
43. Id.; Dan Kahan, who once wrote in favor of the court’s use of shaming sanctions,
recanted and now argues that “[w]hat’s really wrong with shaming penalties. . .is that they
are deeply partisan: when society pick them, it picks sides, aligning itself with those who
subscribe to norms that give pride of place to community and social differentiation rather
than to individuality and equality.” Dan M. Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming
Sanctions, YALE L. LEG. SCHOLARSHIP REP., Paper 102 (2006), http://digitalcommons.law.
yale.edu/fss_papers/102.
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formal social controls and reduces the coercive controls, is a preferred
method of promoting law and order for suitable offenses and offenders.44
B. DEFAMATION (LIBEL

AND

SLANDER)

In countries where it is relatively easy to be sued for defamation,
people are less likely to censure and report or publish information about
anti-social behavior for fear of inviting a lawsuit. This in turn hinders
the activation of communal controls. Many believe this is the case in
Great Britain, home to the “libel capital of the world.” The relative ease
with which authors, journalists and publishers can be sued for writing
about sensitive information has weakened what would otherwise be a
source of informal social control—critical investigative reporting. Free
speech advocates claim “libel laws in England have really constrained
and chilled speech for a long time,” as wealthy individuals and companies are able to essentially buy off public scrutiny with the threat of a
lawsuit.45 The American way is often lauded on Free Speech grounds.
The current analysis suggests that it is to be preferred also on the
grounds that it helps to activate community and reduce the role of the
state.46
C. SECOND CHANCES
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44. Not all shaming sentences are created equal; according to the theory set out in
JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (Cambridge University Press 1989)
(“societies have lower crimes rates if they communicate shame about crime effectively”).
The author draws a distinction between reintegrative shaming, which “communicates
shame to a wrongdoer in a way that encourages him or her to desist,” and stigmatization
which treat criminals as bad people—not people who have done bad things—and leads to
more antisocial behavior. John Braithwaite, Shame and Criminal Justice, 42 CANADIAN J.
CRIMINOLOGY 281, 282 (2000).
45. Eric Pfanner, Britain to Seek Curbs to ‘Libel Tourism’, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/business/media/britain-to-seek-curbs-to-libel-tourism.
html.
46. For a comparative discussion of libel law in the U.S. and Great Britain, see Richard
Garnett & Megan Richardson, Libel Tourism or Just Redress? Reconciling the (English)
Right to Reputation with the (American) Right to Free Speech in Cross-border Libel Cases, 5
J. PRIV. INT’L L. 471 (2009).
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The idea that people deserve a second chance is an important American value. It dates back to those who moved to the New World in search
of a fresh start, and reflects the Judeo-Christian belief in redemption, as
well as the therapeutic culture’s notion that there are few inherently bad
people. Because arrest records were retained in paper ledgers and reports of anti-social behavior were circulated mostly by local newspapers,
visibility was limited and there was a sense of increased privacy. Therefore, the possibility of earning a second chance was more likely during
these times.
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47. James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of
Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 178-179 (2008) (referring to criminal records as a “negative curriculum vitae” and argue that the expanding “availability, use
and scope of criminal records poses a serious challenge to reformers seeking to smooth the
re-entry of ex-offenders into the community” and, ironically, may actually lead to more
crime because “restricted socio-economic opportunities make reoffending more likely”).
48. Kim Zetter, Bad Data Fouls Background Check, WIRED (Mar. 11, 2005), http://
www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2005/03/66856?currentPage=all.
49. Ann Zimmerman & Kortney Stringer, As Background Checks Proliferate, Ex-Cons
Face a Lock on Jobs, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 26, 2004), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10934781
9251301442.html; see Brad Stone, If You Run a Red Light, Will Everyone Know?, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 3, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/03/technology/03essay.html.
50. Percent of Released Prisoners Returning to Incarceration, CRIME IN AMERICA.NET
(Sept. 29, 2010), http://crimeinamerica.net/2010/09/29/percent-of-released-prisoners-returning-to-incarceration.
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The onset of the cyber age is charged with killing second chances as
a source of privacy.47 For example, by digitizing local public records, the
Internet prevents people from throwing off their past. An individual’s
public records now follows him wherever he goes. As a result, Beth Givens, director of the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, writes that Internet
databases cause a loss of “social forgiveness.”48 Others find that when
companies “rely on background checks to screen workers, [they] risk imposing unfair barriers to rehabilitated criminals.”49
Data however strongly indicate that most convicted criminals did
not use their second chance. For example, sixty-seven percent (67%) of
prisoners released in fifteen states in 1994 were re-arrested for a new
offense within three years.50
The National Practitioner Data Bank allows hospitals to find out
whether a doctor’s license has been revoked or the doctor has ever been
disciplined. Generally, a doctor’s license is revoked only if he commits a
serious offense. Prior to online access to a doctor’s revocation and discipline history, physicians who were disbarred in one state would move to
another state in order to continue practicing and commit the same offenses. Few would consider continued obscurity of a doctor’s past offenses good public policy. (Note that in this case, access to data bases is
limited to those who consider retaining them. In effect, the preceding
analysis of the moral order urges that their names be revealed to the
general public.)
All of this is not to suggest that one should ignore those who can be
rehabilitated or deny them their second chances. A mixture of technological and legal means can replace the measures that were once naturally
woven into the fabric of communities. There are laws that protect the
privacy of those who have repaid their debt to society from discrimina-
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tion in housing and hiring.51 A criminal record could be sealed both locally and in online databases, say after seven years, if the person had not
committed a new crime. A rehabilitated criminal’s privacy could be returned to him when his deprivation of privacy would no longer be important for the public’s safety and health.
Internet databases that rely on public records should be required to
update as the public records update and be held accountable for mistakes
in the database. Internet databases should make proper corrections in a
timely fashion following a procedure similar to that of credit records and
also provide mechanisms for filing a complaint if the online data is
erroneous.52
All said and done, this article suggests that to the extent that communities are intact or can be activated and one can draw on informal
social controls to enforce pro-social behavior, the role of the state and its
coercive measures can be curtailed. This requires allowing some limitations on social privacy because communities can curb only the anti-social
behavior that is visible to their members. Laws that shield individual
privacy from members of their families and their communities should
take into account this key observation, making appropriate adjustments.
IV. PUBLIC PRIVACY: REASONABLENESS UNPACKED
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51. Kathryn Dugan, New York Expands Employment-Related Protections for Individuals With a Criminal Conviction Record, EMP. LAW MONITOR (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.
employmentlawmonitor.com/2009/04/articles/employment-policies-and-practi/new-york-expands-employmentrelated-protections-for-individuals-with-a-criminal-conviction-record/;
Center for Community Alternatives, Judicial Diversion: The Contract or Agreement Should
Provide for Stealing, CENTER FOR COMMUNITY ALTERNATIVES BLOG (Jun. 13, 2012), http://
makingreformreality.blogspot.com/. For a review of New York’s criminal record “sealing”
rule, see George F. Carpinello, Public Access to Court Records in New York: The Experience
Under Uniform Rule 216.1 and the Rule’s Future in a World of Electronic Filing, 66 ALBANY
L. REV. 1089 (2003).
52. Federal Trade Commission, How to Dispute Credit Report Errors, FED. TRADE
COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/credit/cre21.shtm.
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When communal processes fail or are inadequate, the state steps
in—either on the side of privacy or the common good. The default position ought to be that privacy is vital for liberty, especially for political
dissent, innovation, and the individualization which is essential for
human flourishing. Yet the right to be secure is equally vital. Theoretically, a society could determine once and for all in its constitution the
proper weight that should be accorded to each of these core values. However, neither rights nor security can be discussed in abstraction of the
historical context, behind some kind of a veil of ignorance. Given the constant changes that societies face in their circumstances (e.g. the 2001
attacks on the American homeland), technological development (e.g. the
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53. Further, what is considered a reasonable expectation is in constant flux due to
technological changes. Thus, as the use of the Internet for personal communications grew,
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 failed protect stored private emails
because it was passed in a time when most emails were related to business records, which
are expected to be afforded a lesser degree of privacy. See Deirdre L. Mulligan, Reasonable
Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557 (2004).
54. Morgan Cloud, Symposium: Rube Goldberg Meets the Constitution: The Supreme
Court, Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 72 MISS. L.J. 5 (2002).
55. Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 843 (2002); Jim Harper, Reforming the Fourth Amendment Privacy Doctrine,
57 AM. U. L. REV. 5 (2008); Haley Plourde-Cole, Back to Katz: Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy in the Facebook Age, FORDHAM URB. L. J. (2010); Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E.
Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment
Cases: An Empirical Look at Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society, 42
DUKE L.J. 727 (1993).
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rise of drones) and numerous other developments, the opposite is the
case. Societies need to constantly re-triangulate the relationship between privacy and the common good.
In searching for criteria to judge whether the re-triangulation has to
move the society’s course in one direction or the other, a sociologist has
great difficulties with the concept of the expectation of privacy. An individual’s personal expectations of privacy are too weak to rely on. Those
who relieve themselves in a swimming pool (if they are unaware of the
urban legend) surely have a strong expectation of privacy; however, it is
far from clear why this expectation of privacy should be respected. At the
same time, those who speak in a sizeable political meeting may well not
have an expectation of privacy; however, surely they should be protected
from government surveillance under most circumstances to protect their
privacy (among other reasons).53
With regard to society’s expectation of privacy, a sociologist is keen
to know which, if any, community will be polled to establish what this
expectation is. The fact that judges seem free to assume they can rely on
their sociological instincts as to what the community expects seems
strange.54 And sociologists would be quick to agree that the whole notion
is circular. Mr. Katz has or does not have an expectation of privacy depending on what the court rules. All this has been said and much better
by legal scholars.55
This in turn suggests the need for a macro Freudian-like analysis,
which entails an examination of the subterranean forces that maintain
this odd legal precept. Freud assumed that there are no accidents in personal life and behavior that seems abnormal or irrational serves some
underlying cause. If such behavior is to be changed, this cause must be
addressed. Freudian macro analysis suggests that the same is true for
societal phenomena. Drug abuse, violent crime, and discrimination all
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persist not because we are unaware of them or made no efforts to tackle
them. They exist because we often address the symptoms rather than the
root causes, make the wrong diagnoses of these subterranean causes, or
do not have the needed resources or will/conviction to change them.
The expectation of privacy seems to persist in part because of the
quest to move privacy from a protection of a space to that of a person.
And to allow judges who seek to legalize a particular kind of search without warrants, to declare that there was no expectation of privacy and
those judges who seek the opposite—to rule that there was.56 Thus, four
years after the Supreme Court ruled that the police had violated Katz’s
Fourth Amendment rights by bugging a pay phone without a warrant,
the Court found that no warrant was needed to bug a phone conversation
in a private home as long as one person approved of the wiretap.57 This
article suggests that both needs can be well served with the following
criteria. The expectation of privacy as a legal precept is best allowed fading away through disuse and courts and policymakers’ best look instead
to the suggested criteria or some other such a set.58
A. FOUR CRITERIA FOR RE-TRIANGULATION
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56. Several legal scholars have written about the Supreme Court’s movement away
from Katz v. United States in its definition of what constitutes a “search.” Peter Swire
writes that current applications of the Fourth Amendment have “dramatically aided government surveillance” and suggests the Court work “collaboratively with the elected
branches” to construct a more reasonable search and surveillance regime. See Peter P.
Swire, Katz is Dead. Long Live Katz, 102 MICH. L. REV. 904, 904-905 (2004).
57. Morgan Cloud, Symposium: Rube Goldberg Meets the Constitution: The Supreme
Court, Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 72 MISS. L.J. 5 (2002).
58. Recently, some have suggested returning to a property-based conception of privacy
in order to strengthen individual’s power to control personal information in an increasingly
digitized world. For a discussion on this topic see Pamela Samuelson, A New Kind of Privacy: Regulating Uses of Personal Data in the Global Information Economy, 87 CAL. L. REV.
751 (1999) (book review); see also Jane B. Baron, Property As control: The Case of Information, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 367 (2012).
59. See ETZIONI, supra note 1.

33835-sft_29-3 Sheet No. 81 Side B

In a previous exploration of privacy, this article tried to show that
four criteria help form the framework for relevant public policies.59
These are briefly revisited here and a contextual consideration is added.
First, a liberal democratic government will limit privacy only if it faces a
well-documented and large-scale threat to the common good (such as
public safety or public health), not merely a hypothetical or one limited
to few individuals or localities. (I avoid the terms “clear and present danger,” despite the similarity, because they have a specific legal reference,
not here followed.) The main reason this threshold must be cleared is
because modifying legal precepts—and with them the ethical, social,
public philosophies that underlie them—endangers their legitimacy.
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60. Jonathan Turley, A Legal Perspective on Drone Strikes, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, US Capitol, Jul 10, 2012.
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Hence the reluctance of the courts to reverse themselves and the criticism of elected officials who change their positions and are therefore depicted as “flip-floppers.” Once tradition is breached, it is difficult to
prevent it from unraveling, a phenomenon often referred to as the slippery slope. Changes, therefore, should not be undertaken unless there is
strong evidence that either the common good or privacy has been significantly undermined. When the HIV/AIDS epidemic spread across the
globe, killing more than two million people each year and infecting millions of others before medications were available that greatly ameliorated the disease and slowed its spread, it was such a condition.
The 2001 attacks on the American homeland—and the risk that
they will be repeated and extended—fully qualify as such a well-documented and large-scale danger. To argue, as law professor Jonathan
Turley did, “that all that happened was the destruction of two buildings
and the killing of a number of people,” may be a noble attempt to minimize the sense of threat to national security in order to protect rights,
but lacks minimal sociological reality.60 These attacks terrorized a nation by turning airplanes full of people into bombs, reaching into the
heart of the national political, economic and communication centers, and
threatening a nation that hereto felt secured by wide oceans. All this was
through an attack carried out by a bunch of youngsters armed with no
more than box cutters and a smaller budget than that of an indie movie.
The notion that a larger number of people are killed by smoking, driving,
and over eating disregards that these are the consequences of changes in
behavior that were long established before their risks were understood;
that they reflect in part people’s choices; and are not imposed on the nation on a single morning, by foreigners. Both HIV and terrorist threats
are deemed of an order that justified some new limitations on privacy. In
contrast, the fears initially garnered by SARS in 2003 proved not to meet
this criterion, nor did the killer bees that were said to swarm from Mexico in 1979.
Secondly, after determining that the common good needs shoring up,
one best seek to establish whether this goal can be achieved without introducing new limits on privacy, by finding ways to advance the common
good without violating privacy. For instance, this is achieved when one
removes personally identifying information (such as names, addresses
and social security numbers) when medical records are needed by researchers thus allowing access to data previously not accessible, e.g. of
Medicare databanks. (Conversely, if privacy needs shoring up, one
should look for ways to proceed that impose no “losses” to the common
good. For instance, allowing the introduction of high power encryption
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61. Philip Zimmerman, Testimony of Philip R. Zimmermann to the Subcommittee on
Science, Technology, and Space of the US Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, (Jun. 26, 1996), at http://www.philzimmermann.comEN/testimony/index.
html.
62. United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012) (in his concurrence, Justice Alito
wrote, “the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges
on expectations of privacy”).
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for personal communications that include “trap doors” that enable authorities to read the messages, under approved conditions.)61
Thirdly, to the extent that privacy-curbing measures must be introduced, they should be minimally intrusive. For example, many agree
that drug tests should be conducted on those directly responsible for the
lives of others, such as school bus drivers. Some employers, however, resort to highly intrusive visual surveillance to ensure that the sample is
taken from the person who delivers it. Instead, one can rely on the much
less intrusive procedure of measuring the temperature of the sample immediately upon delivery.
In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court used the duration of
the surveillance as a criterion, holding that while short term monitoring
might be tolerated, longer term monitoring should be banned.62 A legal
scholar scoffed at this criterion, suggesting that there is no magic point
at which short turns to long. I suggest that the scope of intrusion is
highly relevant because the more behavior and sensitive information is
made visible, the greater the intrusion. The factors that determine scope
include the duration of the surveillance as well as the range of information obtained and its sensitivity. Thus finding out the level of heat in a
home entails extremely little intrusion compared to the surveillance of
conversations, and finding the location of a car at a few points in time is
much less revealing than tracking a person’s cell phone location over
long periods, and extremely less intrusive compared to a time in which
already existing technology is used to monitor people’s brain waves (if
those are found out to truly reveal one’s thoughts and feelings). Hence,
this logic implies, an intrusion of the home that is limited in scope can be
tolerated more readily than an expansive intrusion in a public space. Privacy, at least as here defined, is much more violated by prolonged tracking of public moves and eavesdropping than measuring the heat in one’s
kitchen.
Fourthly, measures that ameliorate undesirable side effects of necessary privacy-diminishing measures are to be preferred over those that
ignore these effects. Thus, if contact tracing is deemed necessary in order
to fight the spread of infectious diseases to protect public health, efforts
must be made to protect the anonymity of those involved. A third party
may inform those who were in contact with an infected individual about
such exposure and the therapeutic and protective measures they ought
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63. Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STANFORD L. REV.
503 (2007).
64. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 50 (2010).
65. The USA Patriot Act: Myth vs. Reality, DEPT. JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov /
archive/ll/subs/add_myths.htm#s206.
66. Id.; Larry Abramson & Maria Godoy, The Patriot Act: Key Controversies, NPR (December 16, 2005), at http://www.npr.org/news/specials/patriotact/patriotactdeal.html.
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to next undertake, without disclosing the identity of the diagnosed
person.
The application of these four balancing criteria helps to ensure that
correctives to a society’s course are both truly needed and not excessive.
Granted, even when these criteria are applied, one cannot pinpoint with
complete precision the proper or optimal course to follow. Societies have
rather crude guidance mechanisms, and need to constantly readjust
their course as they over-steer first in one direction and then in another.
One may suggest that the aforementioned four criteria provide for a
social policy model and that the courts and legal scholars are concerned
with what is constitutional.63 For a sociologist this distinction is not
sharply etched. The law is of course a very major tool of social policy.
Surely, social policy should not be advanced if it violates the U.S. Constitution. And when the Constitution is interpreted in ways that lead to
deeply troubling social policy, the nine wise persons entrusted with deciphering what is constitutional ought to, and surely do, revisit their previous interpretations of what is a living document. That is in effect what
they did in overturning decisions made in cases such as Korematsu v.
United States and Plessy v. Ferguson, and ought to do with Citizen
United.64
A contextual consideration should be added. It might be called the
“No Horse and Buggies Rule.” It suggests that if those who endanger the
public start using cars, one should not insist that the police continue to
use only horses and buggies. The authorities should not be subject to
technological lags compared to the criminals. A case in point concerns
roving wiretaps.
Before 9/11, when the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court approved a warrant to tap a suspect’s phone, that warrant was limited to a
particular phone. This limitation reflected the days when most people
had only one phone. After 9/11, taking into account that people use many
communications devices, the PATRIOT Act revised this rule to allow the
government to tap all the instruments of a given suspect in national security investigations.65 Supporters point out that such wiretaps have
long been allowed for other investigations (such as drug cases and racketeering) and argue that the measure simply updates federal law to a
more technologically-advanced era.66 Detractors, however, argue that
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such wiretaps violate the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that a warrant “particularly describe the place to be searched” and could bring innocent people under the scope of a search (such as anyone who uses the
same public library computer as the target of an investigation).67
Requiring the authorities to go to court and get a warrant for each
instrument, for a person already proven to be a suspect and for whom
there is probable cause to search his communications, simply makes the
authorities lag too much behind those that threaten the common good,
who are free to use all the new technologies the market brings up. It
shall be seen later that there are ways to ensure that the authorities not
abuse this and other such new powers.
Another case in point concerns national warrants. Historically, courtauthorized warrants were local—that is, they specified the town or city
in which the warrant could be administered. However, e-mails travel
through several jurisdictions. Messages from one location are likely to be
stored in another and some messages travel in disparate packets such
that each travel their own route and must be collected in order to make
sense. In response, the PATRIOT Act authorized what are in effect nationwide search warrants for electronic evidence.68
Even privacy advocates have not argued that this adaptation was
unreasonable. The Electronic Frontier Foundation merely argued that
this change in law allows the FBI to go “judge shopping”—that is, to seek
out “only those judges least likely to say no” to a warrant request.69 The
Justice Department, for its part, notes that the “provision can only be
used by courts with jurisdiction over the investigation,” indicating that
whatever “judge shopping” allegedly occurs can only happen within a
range of judges already in a position to oversee the warrant requests.70

As already indicated, to proceed beyond the starting point that the
community always faces multiple legitimate and not fully compatible
concerns, one must ask whether there is a new threat to the common
good (or to privacy)—that calls for recalibration of the prevailing balance
between these two core values. This question cannot be answered abstractly, but must be examined within comparative and historical contexts. Thus, one may see a strong need for more privacy when
considering political acts in China and in North Korea, but not necessa-
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67. USA Patriot Act, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CENTER, http://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/
usapatriot/.
68. The USA Patriot Act: Myth vs. Reality, supra note 65.
69. Let the Sun Set on PATRIOT-Section 220: ‘Nationwide Service of Search Warrants
for Electronic Evidence,’ ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., http://w2.eff.org/patriot/sunset/220.php.
70. The USA Patriot Act: Myth vs. Reality, supra note 65.
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71. For more discussion, see arguments for and against The Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting Light On Spending in Elections Act (DISCLOSE) Act.
72. Amitai Etzioni, HIV Testing of Infants: Should Public Health Override Privacy?, in
THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY (1999) at 17-42.
73. Post-Watergate Intelligence Investigations. http://www.maryferrell.org/wiki/index.
php/PostWatergate_Intelligence_Investigations.
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rily when one deals with financial contributions to elections via the notfor-profit arms of super PACs in the contemporary U.S.71
In considering the present understanding of the right to privacy, historical context is particularly relevant. In the West, individual rights advocacy increased with the rise of new societal groups who had previously
been oppressed by authoritarian monarchies and overbearing churches.
The room for individual expression and variance of conduct (especially
what was considered “deviance”) was further suppressed by social pressures in the strong conformist small villages in which most people lived
(“Salem” stands as an evocative symbol of this life). The rise of individualism, liberalism, and the concept of rights—especially the right to privacy—served to legitimate political action that sought to roll back the
authoritarian rule that blanketed most people’s lives in the Middle Ages
in Europe. These same conditions can be found today in places such as
North Korea and Saudi Arabia. In these polities the tilt against privacy
clearly calls for the opposite re-triangulation, for curtailing the role of
the state and moving the law and public policies to enhance individual
rights, including privacy.
As of the 1960’s, the moral order of the western societies has been
undermined. However, no clear, new shared norms have emerged. In
some cases the common good has been undermined by excessive attention to rights, particularly privacy. Those who bristle at this wording
should revisit the case of hundreds of infants born with HIV, who could
have been spared the ravages of AIDS but were not, and died, in order to
protect the privacy of the mothers.72
Liberal democratic polities function best when they continually reexamine their laws and public policies and adjust them in response to
changes in historical circumstances —to correct what was wrought by
previous over-correction. This is necessary because societies have rather
poor guidance systems and tend to over steer first in one direction and
than in the other, stumbling like a drunken sailor through history. Thus,
the Church and Pike Committees investigated abuses by the CIA, FBI
and NSA in the mid 1970s, uncovering “domestic spying on Americans,
harassment and disruption of targeted individuals and groups, assassination plots targeting foreign leaders, infiltration and manipulation of
media and business.”73 The Church Committee brought to light “Project
Shamrock,” a domestic surveillance program initiated under President
Truman as part of a WWII censorship, which continued to operate into
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74. The Church Committee and FISA, PBS (Oct. 26, 2007), http://www.pbs.org/moyers/
journal/10262007/profile2.html.
75. U.S. Senate, 6 SELECT COMMITTEES TO STUDY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, 94th Cong. (1976), http:/
/archive.org/details/finalreportofsel06unit; For a comprehensive overview of the origins and
developments of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and suggestions on how its procedures could b reformed and oversight increased, see Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 G.W. L. REV. 1306 (2004).
76. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812 (2006).
77. Christopher Hayes, Dealing With the Secret Government, CBS NEWS (Aug. 27,
2009), at http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-215_162-5269340.html.
78. The 9/11 Commission Report (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2004) at
79.
79. For a critical analysis of the “Information Sharing Paradigm” that has arisen in
law enforcement and intelligence community since 9/11, see Peter P. Swire, Privacy and
Information Sharing in the War on Terrorism, 51 VIL. L. REV. 260 (2006).
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the mid-1970s. The NSA monitored and collected communications sent
by American citizens to international organizations.74 The FBI was
found to have engaged in “covert action designed to disrupt and discredit
the activities of groups and individuals deemed a threat to the social order,” such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the
anti-Vietnam War movement.75
In response to these reports, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) and created the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which is responsible for issuing warrants to
permit domestic surveillance of American citizens by the U.S. government.76 It led to a cultural change at the intelligence agencies by putting
in place internal legal controls “requiring layers of attorneys to sign off
on any possibly questionable activities.”77
According to several reports, the reforms introduced in wake of the
Church and Pike committees, and additional rules set by the agencies
themselves, over-corrected the previous imbalance; they were one major
reason that information available to some FBI agents and Bureaus was
not transmitted in ways that could have prevented the 9/11 attacks. The
9/11 Commission Report found that the (sometimes incorrect) interpretation of FISA over the years created inter-agency intelligence sharing procedures that came to be known as “the wall” and the perception in the
FBI, CIA and NSA that no intelligence information could be shared with
other agencies and local police departments.78
After 9/11, the PATRIOT Act was enacted in a great rush and, according to its critics, curtailed privacy excessively in order to enhance
security and “correct” what are considered the excesses of the reforms
the Church and Pike committees set into motion. Since then, the Patriot
Act itself has been recalibrated.79 The question that now must be faced is
whether the American law and public policies currently tilt too far in one
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direction or another, and in which direction they should be re-triangulated. This Article suggests next that not all-current developments call
for the same adjustments.
C. GPS

AS A

POLICE TOOL

The police attached a GPS to the car of a suspected drug dealer. The
Supreme Court, in the case United States v. Jones, unanimously ruled
that this was a violation of his privacy. A liberal communitarian would
point out that according to the first criteria, that of potential harm to the
public, the data indicate that citizens do need to attend more to public
safety. According to national statistics for 2010, fewer than half (47 percent) of violent crimes committed in this country are “cleared” (that is,
suspects are arrested, charged, and turned over for prosecution) and only
one out of five (18 percent) criminals who commit nonviolent crimes
(such as burglary) are caught and tried. Second, there are obviously no
voluntary ways to affect the same results. Third, the intrusion involved
is fairly minimal. Reference is only to cars that travel in public spaces, in
which they are already required to identify their owners (by displaying
license plates) and are subject to police visual surveillance without
warrants.
True, more than eyeballing is involved, because the device must be
attached to the car. However the attachment is outside the vehicle (unlike a “spike mike” driven into the wall of a home, in the case Silverman
v. United States)80 and it reveals only the location of the car, not what is
said or done in it. Moreover, tracking it can be turned off once the car
enters a private space.81 The scope of intrusion is limited and it should
hence be allowed.

Privacy advocates often suggest that whatever new measures the
government introduces to enhance homeland security, public safety, or
public health, are not effective.82 However, when one demonstrates that
the measures are reasonably effective, privacy advocates merely turn to
other arguments to oppose them. Following the introduction of closed
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80. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
81. Some argue that it is the fact that tracking cars reveals multiple locations over a
long period of time (Jones’ car was tracked for 28 days) that makes GPS an unacceptable
invasion of privacy. See Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in
a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. OF CONST.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2012).
82. In a debate between the head of the ACLU at the time, Nadin Strossen, and the
author, Ms. Strossen was asked if she ever found any such measure she approved. Her first
response was a curt “no.” She then amended it to indicate that she could think of one,
thickening the doors that separate the pilot cabin from that of the airline passengers.
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83. Jeffrey Rosen, A Cautionary Tale for a New Age of Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7,
2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/07/magazine/07SURVEILLANCE.html?page
wanted=all.
84. Id.
85. Emma Short & Jason Ditton, Does Closed Circuit Television Prevent Crime? An
Evaluation of the Use of CCTV Surveillance in Airdie Town Centre, (1998), http://www.
scotland.gov.uk/Publications/1998/12/978abe73-d412-4ea3-86a7-e5acf24c8d7a.
86. CCTV: Constant Cameras Track Violators, 249 NAT. INST. JUST. J. 17 (2003).
87. Public surveillance technology such as Geographic Information Systems and improved cameras and systems are established as a capable crime preventer and investigative utility, and it is argued that the only reason why it isn’t perceived as more successful is
because the methods used for studying it limit the results obtained. See Nancy G. La
Vigne, Samantha S. Lowry, Joshua Markman, & Allison Dwyer, Evaluating the Use of Public Surveillance Cameras for Crime Control and Prevention, URBAN INSTITUTE (2011), http://
www.urban.org/publications/412403.html.
88. Steven Bryan, Oklahoma City Bombing Facts and Figures, YAHOO NEWS (Apr. 15,
2011), http://voices.yahoo.com/oklahoma-city-bombing-facts-figures8300355.html?Cat.
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circuit TV (CCTV) on a large scale, privacy advocates argued that CCTV
did not produce any benefit to security and grossly violated privacy.
Thus, Jeffery Rosen, who flew to London to study the matter, reported
that while surveillance cameras were originally “justified as a way of
combating terrorism, they soon came to serve a very different function.”83 Instead of catching terrorists and serious criminals, CCTV was
more often used to target traffic offenders, car thieves, pickpockets,
punks at the mall, and, when young male officers got bored, to zoom in
on attractive women and “boyfriends and girlfriends making out in
cars.”84
Yet, CCTV has led to the arrest of terrorists, serious criminals, and
contributed to significant decreases in crime rates in well-monitored areas. In Airdie, Scotland, “crimes of dishonesty,” such as house and car
break-ins, vehicle theft, and shoplifting, decreased by forty-eight percent
after the installation of CCTVs.85 In Newcastle, burglaries fell by fiftysix percent and criminal property damage by thirty-four percent in areas
covered by CCTV.86 A study that evaluated public surveillance systems
in Washington, D.C., Baltimore and Chicago found that “in places where
cameras were sufficiently concentrated and routinely monitored by
trained staff, the impact on crime was significant and cost-beneficial,
with no evidence of crime displacement.”87
In the 1977 Oklahoma City Bombing, surveillance shows a Ryder
truck parked near the federal building minutes before it exploded. Authorities were able to recover the truck’s axel and trace it back to a body
shop, whose owner identified Timothy McVeigh as the man who rented
it.88 In the trials that followed the July 7th, 2005 suicide bombings in the
London transport system, the jury was shown CCTV footage that shows
the defendants meeting with the suicide bombers and carrying out recon-
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naissance missions.89 CCTV footage captured the images of the 9/11 hijackers, allowing officials to identify them.90 A day after the suicide bus
bombing in Bulgaria that killed seven Israeli tourists, Bulgarian police
were able to identify the suspected terrorists using images from CCTV
footage.91
Considering the second criteria for limiting privacy, the availability
of voluntary alternatives, it is clear that there is no way to accomplish
these same goals through communal means. Indeed, when it was suggested in 2002 that members of the community should act as eyes and
ears of the government, which would reduce the need for CCTVs, a storm
of opposition from privacy advocates followed. The program, Operation
Terrorism Information and Prevention System (TIPS), was eliminated
from the Homeland Security Act, leaving turf to governmental
surveillance.92
As long as CCTV equipment is aimed at specific public spaces, and
the public is notified that it is being observed, its intrusiveness is limited. The physical intrusion of CCTV is minimal (for instance compared
to stop and frisk and body scanners) and no less intrusiveness can be
achieved as long as public spaces are to be surveyed by machines. All
this changes if one merges the feed of many thousands of CCTVs in a city
into one super-database, which allows law enforcement to track people
day and night, a system now being tested in New York City.93 This is
especially true if the capacity of CCTV is expanded to include voice surveillance. The scope of intrusion becomes so omnipotent that such a system should be turned on only when the level of danger is very high, such
as when authorities are searching for a known terrorist who is loose in a
given city. In short, by the criteria established above, the limitations on
privacy posed by localized CCTVs seem to qualify as reasonable.94
AND

BODY SCANNERS: VOLUNTARY

When screening gates were first introduced in 1972, the ACLU ar-
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89. Jury Sees 7/7 Bombing CCTV Images, BBC (May 1, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/uk_news/7377649.stm.
90. Video Shows 9/11 Hijackers’ Security Check, USA TODAY (Jul. 21, 2004), http://
www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-07-21-attacks-surveillance-dulles_x.htm.
91. Phoebe Greenwood, Bulgarian Police Release Images of Suicide Bombing Suspect,
GUARDIAN (Jul. 19, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/19/bulgaria-bombingpolice-release-footage.
92. Nat Hentoff, The Death of Operation TIPS, THE VILLAGE VOICE (Dec. 17, 2002),
http://www.villagevoice.com/2002-12-17/news/the-death-of-operation-tips/1/.
93. Joe Coscarelli, The NYPD’s Domain Awareness System Is Watching You, N.Y. MAG.
(Aug. 9, 2012), http://nymag.com/daily/intel/2012/08/nypd-domain-awareness-systemmicrosoft-is-watching-you.html.
94. Different issues may arise when the person being targeted by surveillance is considered suspicious. See Slobogin, supra note 81.
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95. Is Liberty Lost During Emergencies? UNITED States Senate Republican Policy Committee Report, Nov. 7, 2011, http://rpc.senate.gov/releases/1999/cv110701.htm#N_6_.
96. Id.
97. ACLU Backgrounder on Body Scanners and “Virtual Strip Searches”, ACLU (Jan.
8, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/aclu-backgrounder-body-scannersand-virtual-strip-searches.
98. Id.
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gued that they were ineffectual.95 Actually, they stopped skyjacking. In
the four years leading up to the implementation of universal airport
screening in 1973 there were 109 (roughly twenty-seven per year) aircraft hijackings in the U.S. In 1973, there were two, and while there was
an uptick in the early 1980’s, there were no successful skyjackings from
1992-2000.96
These gates gained much more application after the 2001 attack on
American homeland. After additional attempts were made to blow up
airlines full of civilians in 2010, major American airports introduced
backscatter and millimeter-wave sensing devices (popularly known as
full body scanners) that check whether people hide forbidden objects
under their clothes. Privacy advocates refer to them as “virtual stripsearches.”97
The ACLU stated that “some experts have said explosives can be
hidden by being molded against the human body, or in folds of skin, and
British newspapers are reporting that government testing in the UK
found that the technology comes up short in detecting plastic, chemicals
and liquids.”98 Putting aside the question of whether these matters
should be settled on the basis of what the notoriously unreliable British
newspapers report, one notes that this argument about lack of effectiveness—the same type that the ACLU applies to nearly every security
measure—does not answer the question of how much security the scanners add. And, if it turns out that they are quite effective, the privacy
advocates merely turn to other arguments.
Most importantly, the body scanners are a voluntary measure. People are free to choose a pat-down rather than pass through the millimeter-wave machine, and even then about seventy percent of Americans
say they prefer to be scanned. (The option of choosing a pat-down should
not be considered unduly coercive, because random pat-downs were
mandatory before the installation of body scanners—and even civil libertarians stopped arguing that there should be no scrutiny at all of those
who are about to fly.)
Turning to the third criteria, the intrusiveness of the scanners is
much smaller than often claimed. In order to illustrate how intrusive
they are, privacy advocates display a rather graphic image obtained from
a scanner (see left frame below). Yet, this image is not of an airline pas-

33835-sft_29-3 Sheet No. 87 Side A

08/13/2013 08:57:11

\\jciprod01\productn\S\SFT\29-3\SFT307.txt

2012]

unknown

Seq: 29

LIBERAL COMMUNITARIAN CONCEPTION

12-AUG-13

9:33

447

senger but of a TSA employee who volunteered to test the machine. The
actual images are much less graphic. See on the right side.
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99. “See Through” Body Scanners, ACLU (Jun. 3, 2008), http://www.aclu.org/
technology-and-liberty/see-through-body-scanners.
100. Airport security full body scanners: up close and personal, THE BAY AREA TRAVELER
(Jun. 15, 2010), http://thebat-sf.com/2010/06/15/airport-body-scanners-up-close-andpersonal/.
101. Frequently Asked Questions: Advanced Imaging Technology, TSA, http://www.tsa.
gov/approach/tech/ait/faqs.shtm.
102. David G. Savage, The Fight Against Full-body Scanners at Airports, L.A. TIMES
(Jan. 13, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/13/nation/la-na-terror-privacy13-2010
jan13.
103. You asked for it. . .You got it, Millimeter Wave images, TSA BLOG (May 9, 2008),
http://blog.tsa.gov/2008/05/you-asked-for-ityou-got-it-millimeter.html.
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Image used by the ACLU99 Actual image seen of passengers by
TSA agents100
Moreover, the images of passengers that actually appear on TSA
screens are much less revealing, because the scanners are equipped with
two kinds of privacy filters.101 One conceals the genitals and the other
the face. (What’s more, new scanner software replaces the realistic
images of the passengers who are being scanned with a cartoon of a
generic, clothed body, and marks areas that should be checked
further.102 This software is currently being tested.) Further preserving
privacy, TSA staffers who view the images are in a separate room and
are unaware of the identity of the passenger who is screened.103
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Finally, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), in its
critique of scanners, states that new security measures “present privacy
and security risks to air travelers because they might create data files
directly linked to the identity of air travelers. These files, if retained,
could provide the basis for a database of air traveler profiles.”104 The
New Republic’s Jeffrey Rosen argues that “the greatest privacy concern
is that the images may later leak.”105 Other privacy advocates hold that
the radiation involved may harm one’s health. Yet these hypothetical
concerns pale in comparison to the possibility that terrorists might bring
down another airplane, or worse.
In short, screen gates in general and full body scanners in particular
seem to qualify as effective new tools of homeland security if judged by
the communitarian criteria set out. The use of these security measures
is in the public’s interest, poses very limited harm, contributes to
security, has a limited scope of intrusion, and is in part voluntary.
F. DRONES: EXCESSIVE INTRUSION
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104. Whole Body Imaging Technology and Body Scanners (“Backscatter” X-Ray and
Millimeter Wave Screening), ELECT. PRIVACY INFO. CENTER, http://epic.org/privacy/air
travel/backscatter/.
105. Jeffrey Rosen, Nude Awakening: The Dangerous Naked Machines, THE NEW
REPUBLIC (Jan. 29, 2010), http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/nude-awakening?page=0,1.
106. Jason Koebler, Court Upholds Domestic Drone Use in Arrest of American Citizen,
U.S. NEWS (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/08/02/court-upholdsdomestic-drone-use-in-arrest-of-american-citizen.
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The domestic use of drones, also known as “unmanned aerial vehicles” (UAVs) by law enforcement agencies “passes” the first and second
criteria but faces very serious challenges on the basis of the third one.
Drones are an effective response to the new security challenges posed by
9/11 and well serve public safety and other common good purposes. For
instance, in North Dakota a drone was used for surveillance purposes to
assist in the arrest of a man engaged in an armed standoff with police
after he refused to return six cows that had wandered on to his ranch to
their rightful owner. The drone flew over the property (in public, navigable airspace) to make sure the man was still present and unarmed prior
to the launching of the arrest raid.106 There are clearly no other voluntary measures that could provide anything that approaches the level of
surveillance drones provide.
However, drones fail to meet the third criteria because they are
much more intrusive than other means that enhance public safety. At
first it may seem that the main reason for the preceding statement is
that drones can readily survey spaces hereto considered private or semiprivate such as one’s backyard, roof tops, verandas, and space greatly
removed from public thoroughfares. Drones differ from other security
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107. Ryan Calo & John Villasenor, Ten Myths About Drones, HUFFINGTON POST (May
22, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ryan-calo/drones-myths_b_1537040.html.
108. Benjamin Wittes & John Villasenor, Regulating Domestic Drones on a Deadline,
WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/faa-regulation-ofdrones-will-challenge-our-privacy-expectations/2012/04/19/gIQA9IH8TT_story.html; see
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); see Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 455 (1989).
109. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27.
110. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Drones, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CENTER, http:/
/epic.org/privacy/drones/.
111. Open Letter to Michael P. Huerta (U.S. Federal Aviation Administration), ELEC.
PRIVACY INFO. CENTER (Feb. 24, 2012), http://epic.org/privacy/drones/FAA-553e-Petition-0308-12.pdf.
112. M. Ryan Calo, The Drone as a Privacy Catalyst, 64 STANFORD L. REV. 29 (2012).
113. Open Letter to Michael P. Huerta, supra note 111.
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cameras in that they do not only monitor public spaces, but “can see any
area visible from the air,” including private residences.107 However, the
same can be said about planes and helicopters. And the U.S. Supreme
Court has held that individuals may be surveyed by manned aircraft
without a warrant because any person could (theoretically) observe anything in the open from the “public navigable airspace.”108 However, the
Supreme Court also ruled in 2001 that “the use of a device that is not in
‘general public use’ is a search even if it does not physically invade the
home.”109 Because most people do not utilize UAVs on a regular basis,
the use of drones or UAVs to collect information without a warrant may
therefore qualify as an unlawful search.110
Privacy advocates are also concerned that drones may soon be
equipped with video or infrared cameras, heat sensors, GPS, sensors that
detect movement, automated license plate readers111 and even with
technology to intercept wireless communications, all of which would
greatly exceed the minimal intrusion condition.112 Further, it may be
possible to equip drones with facial recognition technology linked to catalogs of identification information such as the FBI Next Generation Identification database, which would give the government or private
corporations new powers to track individuals.113 However, the same is
true about manned flying machines and even blimps.
The main intrusiveness of drones arises from two other factors. First
and foremost, unlike piloted aviations systems, which can briefly pass or
linger above any one space, drones can readily provide surveillance for
many hours, continuously. Indeed, there are no technical difficulties in
using them to provide non-stop surveillance. This is a very major quantitative leap from the use of piloted aviation systems. Also, drones, unlike
UAVs, are as a rule invisible and often inaudible to those subject to their
scrutiny. That means that individuals must assume that they may be
under surveillance at all times, without notification or warning (the kind
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CCTV provides) in all places but inside one’s home or workplace (but
only as long as the shades are drawn and the shutters closed).
These observations suggest that drones be banned from routine security use and their use limited to exceptional cases, such as finding
missing people, watching for natural disasters, and when there are firm
indications that there is a major security threat (e.g. when the national
alert level is raised) or probable cause demonstrated in a court of law.
Congressman Landry (R-LA) has introduced an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act that prohibits the introduction into
court evidence collected by drones without a warrant.114 The amendment passed, and since then, additional bills stipulating the same have
been introduced in both houses of Congress.115 Government officials
claim that they would obtain a warrant before utilizing UAVs to survey
residents of the United States.116 These steps seem to be moving in the
direction that a liberal communitarian analysis favors.117 In short, although drones can rather effectively serve a major common good, and
there are no voluntary substitutes, their intrusion is so exceptionally
high that their employment should be limited to situations in which
there is a particularly strong and urgent public need, or where each application is first subject to a review by a court.
G. MEDICAL INFORMATION: MORE PRIVACY NEEDED
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114. Amendment to the Rules Committee Print of H.R. 4310, 112th Cong., 2nd Sess., at
http://www.rules.house.gov/amendments/LANDRY_097_xml51512090055055.pdf.
115. See Preserving Freedom from Unwanted Surveillance Act of 2012, H.R. 5925,
112th Cong. (2012); Preserving Freedom from Unwanted Surveillance Act of 2012, S.R.
3287, 112th Cong. (2012).
116. Darrell Preston, Drones Take To American Skies On Police, Search Missions,
BLOOMBERG (May 31, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-31/drones-take-toamerican-skies-on-police-search-missions.html.
117. See Calo, supra note 112. This discussion points to the possibility of unmanned
drones being used domestically, and how this new development in security may catalyze a
dramatic modernization of privacy law.
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The same criteria that were used to justify granting more leeway to
the common good and limiting privacy in most of the cases above—lead
to the opposite conclusion in the case of medical privacy. Health and
medical records deserve special protection not only because they contain
the most intimate details of an individual’s self, but because in the hands
of the wrong people (e.g. potential employers), such information can lead
to unfair discrimination and have significant financial consequences. In
the past, gross violations of privacy in this realm—some of which were
perfectly legal at the time—were all too common. Important steps have
since been taken to strengthen privacy protections. But in the face of
technological advances that have transformed the way health records
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are stored and shared, government and industry officials must be vigilant in maintaining up-to-date security and health employees trained to
properly use new technologies.
Before 2003, major violations of the most intimate and sensitive
kind of privacy, that of information about one’s medical conditions, were
surprisingly common—with no benefits for the common good. Some involved the unauthorized use of medical information. A database created
by the state of Maryland in 1993 to keep the medical records of all its
residents for cost containment purposes was illegally sold by state employees to representatives of health maintenance organizations (HMOs).
In Florida, a state health department worker using state computers compiled a list of 4,000 people with HIV and forwarded it to two newspapers.118 When a woman from New York was running for Congress in
1992, someone obtained hospital records that detailed her attempted suicide and leaked it to the press.119

118. Doug Stanley & Craig S. Palosky, HIV Tracked on Unauthorized Lists, TAMPA
TRIB., Oct. 3, 1996, at 1.
119. Christine Gorman, Who’s Looking at Your Files? Tim HIV Tracked on Unauthorized Lists, May 6, 1996, reprinted in Robert Emmet Long, ed., RIGHTS TO PRIVACY (New
York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1997), 81-84.

121. E. Virginia Lapham, Chahira Kozma, & Joan O. Weiss, Genetic Discrimination:
Perspectives of Consumers, 274 SCI. 621, 624 (1996).

C M
Y K

08/13/2013 08:57:11

120. U.S. Congress, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-BP-BA-67, MEDICAL MONITORSCREENING IN THE WORKPLACE: RESULTS OF A SURVEY (1991); David F. Linowes, A
Research Survey of Privacy in the Workplace (Apr. 1996) (unpublished paper, on file with
the University at Urbana-Champaign).

ING AND
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Often legal, before 2003, but equally damaging to medical privacy
was a systematic flow of medical information from the health insurance
and management corporations to other parties, including employers,
marketers, and the press. For example, thirty-five percent of Fortune
500 corporations drew on personal health information, stored in their
self-insurance divisions, in making employment decisions.120 A 1996
study by Harvard and Stanford found 206 cases of genetic discrimination
against asymptomatic individuals who suffered loss of employment, loss
of insurance coverage, or ineligibility for insurance based on their potential for disease gleaned from personal genetic tests.121
Much of such use of personal medical information became illegal in
2003 when the Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health
Information (also know as the “Privacy Rule”) were implemented as part
of the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA), which passed in 1996. The rule regulates the use and dissemination of Protected Health Information (PHI) and limits the circumstances when such information can be disclosed without patient
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authorization.122 Some additional steps in this direction are included in
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. The law further
limits the sale and use of medical records for marketing and fundraising,
and grants individuals the ability to track accidental or purposeful disclosures of their records by requiring doctors to keep “audit trails.”123
There are reasons to further extend these protections. Too many
health care facilities do not adequately protect their data banks. The
Chicago Tribune reported in April 2012 that since 2009, “400 large
health care breaches affecting at least 500 people and more than 50,000
smaller breaches have been reported to the federal government.” Five
million people were affected when a computer was stolen at TRICARE, a
health program for members of the military, and 250,000 individuals in
Illinois have had their private health data exposed between 2009 and
2012.124 Because it is often difficult to trace the source of online information leakage, policy researchers recommend a “traitor-tracing
scheme. . .that facilitates digital forensics following the illegal copying
and redistribution of digital media data.”125 Stronger enforcement is also
needed. In the four years after the implantation of the Privacy Rule, 350
complaints were filed, of which only four were prosecuted by the Department of Justice and as of June 2012 only fifteen cases of HIPAA violations have led to court settlements, penalties, or criminal convictions.126
The 2009 Affordable Care Act also requires “Health Information Exchanges” (HEIs) that allow health care providers to share medical
records electronically which they will do by partnering with private companies like Microsoft and General Electric. One software security expert
raises the concern that a national network such as this would be vulnerable to attacks that compromise privacy and worries about Microsoft
having “a near-monopoly controlling the overwhelming majority of sys-

08/13/2013 08:57:11

C M
Y K

33835-sft_29-3 Sheet No. 89 Side B

122. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH HUM. SERV., http://
www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/index.html; Alexandra Podrid,
HIPAA—Exceptions Providing Law Enforcement Officials and Social Service Providers Access to Protected Health Information, 16 NAT’L CENTER FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE 4
(2003).
123. HIPAA Privacy & Security Audit Program, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH HUM. SERV.,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/audit/protocol.html.
124. Deborah L. Shelton, Health Records Lost, Stolen or Revealed Online, CHI. TRIB.
(Apr. 23, 2012) http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-04-23/news/ct-met-health-databreaches-20120423_1_breaches-health-privacy-health-care.
125. Azadeh Nematzadeh & L. Jean Camp, Threat Analysis of Online Health System,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 3RD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PERVASIVE TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO ASSISTIVE ENVIRONMENTS, 31 (2010), at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1839294.
1839331.
126. Doreen Z. McQuarrie, HIPPA Criminal Prosecutions: Few and Far Between, U.
HOUSTON L. CENT. (2007), http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2007/(DM)
HIPAACrimCharges.pd; HIPAA Convictions/Fines/Settlements, HIPAA Security and Privacy, at http://www.hipaasecurityandprivacy.com/p/convictions-fines.html.
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tems.”127 Other experts say concerns are overblown, but agree that HEIs
do indeed increase security risks and that “[t]he key is to build them
right, with appropriate security and privacy controls, standards and policies, from the very beginning.”128 States are required to join an exchange
by 2014, so it is pivotal that rushing to meet that deadline does not sacrifice investing in the strengthened security technology and worker training needed to prevent large-scale breaches of privacy.129
In sum, to determine what constitutes reasonable law and public
policy, considering whether privacy or common good concerns are to be
privileged, would benefit if four criteria are employed: the scope of the
threats to the common good, whether these can be satisfied by voluntary
measures, whether the proposed intrusion is minimal, and whether attention is paid to mitigating the side effects. Such continuous reevaluation of the nation’s legal positions and public policies is needed because
societies at any given time tend to over-steer in one direction or the
other. Currently, the American system seems to require corrections that
do not all point in the same direction. In some areas new technologies
call for granting more weight to the common good, in others—to privacy
protection.
V. THE SURVEILLANCE OF SURVEILLANCE, A
CYBERNETIC PERSPECTIVE

C M
Y K

08/13/2013 08:57:11

127. Taylor Amerding, Health exchange privacy concerns overblown, experts say, CSO
(Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.csoonline.com/article/713846/health-exchange-privacy-concerns-overblown-experts-say.
128. Id.
129. See Gina Stevens, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41756, PRIVACY PROTECTIONS FOR PERSONAL INFORMATION ONLINE (2011). The differences between new privacy and security
health risks to online health systems are defined, and a traitor-tracing solution is offered to
counter the risks in order to ensure that electronic health records become a viable option
for databases.
130. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE FREE SOCIETY (1971).
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Societies are cybernetic systems in the sense that they have overlays
that guide the layers of action, somewhat like nerves are used to guide
muscles.130 When these overlays are too weak, they allow for actions
that damage both rights and the common good such as wide spread corruption, crime, and abuse. When they are overwhelming, they tend to
retard action, suppress innovation, and slow adaptation to historical
changes. Hence, in addition to seeking the proper course of action—for
instance, between maximum privacy and maximum security—societies
need to find the proper balance between action and guidance (which include not merely consensus building, elections, and policy making but
also oversight and accountability). In liberal democracies guidance tends
to be deficient, hence it is the focus of the following discussion. It is es-
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sential because there is an inverse relation between commanding sufficient guidance and limiting the latitude one can grant to state’s action.
The more the government action is properly supervised, the more the
government is accountable and can be trusted—the more one can assume that whatever additional powers it is granted will be use only for
legitimated purposes—the more communitarian triangulation can tilt in
favor of the common good.
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131. Audit Program Protocol, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH HUM. SERV., http://www.hhs.gov/
ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/audit/protocol.html.
132. Rick Newman, Trust in Government and Other Institutions Hits New Lows, U.S.
NEWS (Jun. 20, 2012) http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/rick-newman/2012/06/20/trust-ingovernment-and-other-institutions-hits-new-lows.
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The issue is illustrated by considering the use of the E-Z Pass.
These passes can be employed and a very high measure of privacy can
still be maintained—if immediately after the tollbooth computer establishes that the toll has been paid, the date and time information about
the car’s passage through the gate is erased. The extreme opposite situation arises if this information is added to a person’s dossier, remains
there without time limits, and is accessible to authorities and perhaps
even others, such as divorce lawyers and the media.
Assume next that the authorities announce that the E-Z pass computers are programmed to maximize privacy. Such an assurance obviously does not suffice, because one cannot assume that the government
will heed the policy it announces. The essence of the American political
system is based on the idea that the public may trust the government but
also receive verification that this trust is not misplaced. There have been
many instances of abuse—from Nixon’s enemies list and use of the IRS
to harass his opponents to J. Edgar Hoover spying on Martin Luther
King, Jr.—to confirm the public refusal to blindly trust the government.
This deep sense is addressed through America’s system of checks and
balances, the free press, Congressional oversight, the introduction of the
Offices of the Inspector General, and reports by the Government Accountability Office, among others.
One major way to further enhance accountability is to employ new
technologies for this purpose. One key example is a wider use of audit
trails, a computer program which keeps records of who has stored information, which in turn allows one to determine whether that person was
authorized to access it.131 Yet despite all these mechanisms, the public’s
trust in the government is quite low.132 Additional steps are called for to
both ensure that accountability is high enough and that the public will
be able to better trust its government. This requires enlisting modes of
oversight that draw not on the government but the public, somewhat like
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civilian review board of police departments.133
One way to enhance accountability through public involvement is to
form an independent privacy review board. One such board, the Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, was proposed by the 9/11 Commission (itself a model of a review board) and established as part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.134 The board
was to be composed of distinguished private citizens selected by the President, with a Chairman and Vice Chairman to be confirmed by the Senate.135 Critics of the board maintained that it “appeared to be a
presidential appendage, devoid of the capability to exercise independent
judgment and assessment or to provide impartial findings and recommendations.”136 The board’s former Vice Chairman, Alan Charles Raul,
has disputed that allegation, pointing to a report the board issued that
was highly critical of the FBI.137 Nonetheless, the 110th Congress moved
the board outside of the White House and established it as an independent agency.138 The Senate did not confirm any of President Bush’s replacement nominees.139 In December of 2011, Obama nominated five
board members, four of whom were confirmed by the Senate on August 2,
2012.140 No action was taken in confirmation of David Medine, who is
nominated for chairman of the board, and without whom the board will
not be able to hire staff or possibly begin work.141 Given the current high
level of distrust in the government, there seems to be a strong case for
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133. In a green paper the Department of Commerce advocated for the creation of a Privacy Policy Office to complement the work of the Federal Trade Commission in constructing privacy policy. Privacy advocates argued this would undermine the work of the FTC,
but Peter Swire supports the idea, or a comparable office house in the Executive Office of
the President, as it would provide “a more effective structure for the administration to
weigh privacy concerns with other competing policy goals and values.” See Peter P. Swire,
Why the Federal Government Should Have a Privacy Policy Office, CENTER AM. PROGRESS
(2011).
134. THE WHITE HOUSE, PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD (2004), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/privacyboard/.
135. Id.
136. Garrett Hatch, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34385, PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
OVERSIGHT BOARD: NEW INDEPENDENT AGENCY STATUS (2009).
137. Alan Charles Raul, Privacy and Civil Liberties: Where’s the Watchdog?, WASH.
POST (Oct. 23, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/22/
AR2009102203802.html.
138. Garrett Hatch, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34385, PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
OVERSIGHT BOARD: NEW INDEPENDENT AGENCY STATUS (2009), at 5.
139. Id. at 8.
140. U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, NOMINATIONS: PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/nominations/112th
CongressExecutiveNominations/PrivacyAndCivilLibertiesOversightBoard.cfm.
141. Mark Rockwell, Senate Confirms Privacy Oversight Board Nominees, but Leaves
Out Chairman, GSN (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.gsnmagazine.com/node/26931?c=federal_
agencies_legislative.
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142. The American Bar Association makes similar suggestions. See AMERICAN BAR ASSTANDARDS OF GOVERNING TECHNOLOGICALLY-ASSISTED PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE
11 (1999) (“The legislature should provide accountability for the provisions governing access to and storage and disclosure of records maintained by institutional third parties via
appropriate criminal, civil, and/or evidentiary sanctions, and appropriate periodic review
and public reporting”).

SOCIATION,

143. Dan Eggen & Julie Tate, U.S. Campaign Produces Few Convictions on Terrorism
Charges, WASH. POST (Jun. 12, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/06/11/AR2005061100381.html.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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moving forward quickly with his confirmation and reactivating the
board’s work.
This or some other such board, whose staff and members have security clearances, could help reassure the public by issuing annual reviews
that would report whether various new security measures (a) were
abused and (b) were effective.142 A good place to start would be to review
the cases brought before the FISA court and determine whether it is too
lax or too strict. And the board could inform the public whether those
who have access to the output of massive computerized searches use
them for legitimate purposes and what measures are taken to further
minimize abuse when it is uncovered.
The way in which such reviews could serve the public is illustrated
by a Washington Post investigation of President Bush’s claim in defense
of the expanded surveillance powers granted to law enforcement and intelligence agencies by the PATRIOT Act that “federal terrorism investigations have resulted in charges against more than 400 suspects, and
more than half of those charged have been convicted.”143 The Washington Post reviewed that claim and concluded “the numbers are misleading
at best.”144 Its analysis found that “39 people—not 200, as officials have
implied—were convicted of crimes related to terrorism or national security.”145 And among all those charged as a result of terrorism investigations in the three years following the September 11th attacks, the Post
found “no demonstrated connection to terrorism or terrorist groups for
180 of them.”146 Moreover, “a large number of people appear to have
been swept into U.S. counterterrorism investigations by chance—
through anonymous tips, suspicious circumstances or bad luck—and
have remained classified as terrorism defendants years after being
cleared of connections to extremist groups.”147 In response to Bush’s defense, Lisa Graves of the ACLU stated, “[t]he real problem is that these
record searches take place behind closed doors and are kept secret
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forever.”148
There was much in the report to support those who distrust the government and to raise serious doubts about whether the new powers accorded the government are justified. In contrast, if such a review had
shown that most of these cases involved terrorists setting out to commit
major acts of violence, the public would have leaned in the opposite direction. An established civilian review board charged with overseeing whom
the government is collecting information about, with what cause and by
what means, could play a similarly useful function. Clearly such a board
could not look into every single one of the thousands of investigations
conducted on U.S. citizens by law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
But it could look at a random sample, of say, 200 cases, and determine if
the majority involved individuals that actually presented a security risk.
Such information would assure the public that the privacy sacrificed to
heightened surveillance was worth the benefit of increased national security—or conversely expose that the government had overreached and
upset the proper balance between privacy and the common good.
In short, the more extensive and effective accountability is provided,
within the context of liberal democratic societies, whose guidance and
oversight methods tend to be deficient—the more latitude could be
granted to the government, without fearing that privacy would be wantonly violated or that that it would be limited without significant security gains. Furthermore, such mechanisms could help ensure that
security measures would be minimally intrusive and their side effects
would be mitigated.
VI. EROSION OF PUBLIC/PRIVATE BOUNDARIES
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148. Patriot Act Works, Bush Claims, WIRED (Jun. 9, 2005) http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2005/06/67807.
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The discussion so far has followed a very strongly established tradition in Western legal thought and normative deliberations that draws a
sharp line between the public and the private realms. This line is most
evident in discussions of individual rights, which are rights against the
government, seeking to curb its power and to protect the person from the
state. Thus, the right to privacy is first and foremost a right against the
government, as revealed in historical cases such as grievances raised
against the Quartering Acts, which required the colonies to provide
housing for British soldiers. One finds the same focus on protection from
the government in the reproductive rights cases that are at the foundation of the federal, constitutional right to privacy in the U.S.
The Privacy Act of 1974 limits the right of the government to collect
personal data but not that of the private sector. Many of the issues typically raised by privacy advocates concern surveillance, data banks,
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tracking, and other forms of search, focus first and foremost on the government. Although individuals do enjoy some legal protections against
corporations and each other, these are often less clearly delineated and
even less enforced. Thus, one’s right to privacy against corporations at
the work place, is much less clear than the right to protection from government surveillance, and varies from state to state. The same holds regarding protections from the media and peeping toms.
Over the last decade or so though, the boundaries between the private and public realms have been greatly diminished, both in general
and in matters concerning privacy in particular. Currently, private corporations keep detailed dossiers on hundreds of millions of Americans,
including not just what they purchase, but also tracking what Internet
users read, visit, eat and drink, who users call, email and date, and much
else. Other dossiers are kept on crimes a person has committed, divorces
and political leanings, financial contributions, as well as interest in topics such as religion, the Bible, gambling and adult entertainment.149 One
may assume that given that the government is banned from collecting
such information about Americans and building dossiers on innocent
people, it could not use private agents to accomplish that which the government is banned from doing itself. However, this is far from clear, as
one sees in matters other than privacy.
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149. In 2005 one data aggregation company, Choicepoint, had records on over 220 million people. See They’re Watching You, BUS. WK. (Jan. 24, 2005), http://www.businessweek.
com/magazine/content/05_04/b3917056_mz005.htm; see also Ryan Singel, Newly Declassified Files Detail Massive FBI Data-Mining Project, WIRED (Sept. 23, 2009), http://www.
wired.com/threatlevel/2009/09/fbi-nsac/; and Ryan Singel, Privacy and Consumer Profiling,
ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CENTER, http://epic.org/privacy/profiling/.
150. DANIEL SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (NYU Press 2004) at 169.
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As far as privacy is concerned, the issue is moot. Even if the government does not contract private corporations to collect and process personal data of the kinds the government is prohibited from collecting and
banking, the corporations can and do collect and accumulate such data
and make it available to the government on their own. Given that the
government is a large and reliable client, shaping the data in ways that
they will serve the government’s needs is much in the self interest of
these corporations. Hence, according to Daniel Solove, “the government
has been increasingly contracting with businesses to acquire databases
of personal information.”150 ChoicePoint, a major private sector commercial data broker, has thirty-five contracts with government agencies, including the FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration, and IRS. A 2011
FBI manual authorizes agents to search for private citizens in commer-
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cial databases without prior authorization or notification.151 One may
well hold that some of the usages of private databases by the government
serve legitimate purposes, even if they are loaded with extensive dossiers
on most adult Americans, rather than being restricted to those for which
there is some evidence or reason to suspect that they are violating the
law. However, one must still note that from here on, whether such
databanks are in the FBI headquarters or in some corporate office matters little. At most, they are just a click—and a payment—away.
It follows that if privacy is to be better protected, these protections
will have to cover both the private and the public sector. This may seem
obvious but it also entails a very major rethinking of the age-old dichotomy between the public and private realms. Steps in this direction include a slew of laws that limit the violation of privacy by private actors in
one specific area or another. These include consumer credit reports, education records, bank records, video rental records, motor vehicle records,
health information, children’s online information, and customer financial
information.152 This patchwork of laws can be viewed as based on a rationale that treats differently three main areas—private information
gleaned from public records (e.g. house ownership), relatively sensitive
information (especially medical and financial), and information that is,
in effect, deemed less sensitive (most consumer choices).153
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151. Charlie Savage, FBI Agents Get Leeway to Push Privacy Bounds, N.Y. TIMES, Jun.
13, 2011, at A1.
152. Gina Stevens, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41756, PRIVACY PROTECTIONS FOR PERSONAL INFORMATION ONLINE (2011).
153. A similar approach is taken by the American Bar Association. See American Bar
Association, STANDARDS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY RECORDS (2012).
154. People often trust assurances that their sensitive information (names and social
security number) can be deleted when their data is collected in large databases. In fact,
scientists have shown that individuals can be easily “deanonymized.” Paul Ohm writes that
this misunderstanding has given the public a false sense of security and has lead to inadequate privacy protections, laws and regulations. Peter Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy:
Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010); see
also Marcia Stepanek, Weblining, BUS. WK. (Apr. 3, 2000), http://www.businessweek.com/
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Public records, therefore, are open for dissemination online because
this information was not private in the first place; less sensitive information is considered in need of little protection because no or little harm is
inflicted when it is used by third parties; and sensitive information is
protected. And to the extent that one finds that some area is not well
protected, the argument runs, Congress should add another “patch” to
cover this area. However, because evidence shows that insensitive information can be used to determine sensitive information, laws are needed
that not only ban the use of sensitive information but also ban indirect
access to protected areas.154
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For example, in the case of Health Information Exchanges, there are
concerns that the data that is entered into HEIs—though it is to be encrypted—could easily be “de-anonymized.” In 2006, AOL released the
search records—stripped of “personal identifiers”—of over 600,000 people. An investigation by the New York Times demonstrated that extremely intimate information—including names and faces—could be
gleaned from purportedly anonymous data. A breach of an HIE could
have much more serious consequences than it being revealed that one
AOL user—Thelma Arnold—searched “school supplies for Iraq children,”
“safest place to live” and “the best season to visit Italy.”155 For this reason, privacy advocate and lawyer Grayson Barber suggests that it should
be made a crime to “re-indentify” medical records.156 That is, the wall
that separates more sensitive and less sensitive information is shored up
as well. (Granted, the debate about what is sensitive and what is not
would continue.) That is, the law would ban private and public agents,
corporations and the government, from using information on what one
purchases (and other such “less” sensitive information) to divine one’s
medical condition (and other such “more” sensitive information).
VII. IN CONCLUSION
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2000/00_14/b3675027.htm; Jennifer Golbeck, Christina Robles & Karen Turner, Predicting
Personality with Social Media, CHI EXTENDED ABSTRACTS (2011).
155. Micheal Barbaro & Tom Zeller, Jr., A Face Is Exposed for AOL Searcher No.
4417749, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technology/09aol.
html?pagewanted=all.
156. Grayson Barber, Electronic Health Records and the End of Anonymity, 198 N.J. L.
J. 227 (2009).
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Privacy is a core value. It is essential for political dissent, innovation, and individuation. The default position of the law and public policy
should be that privacy must be well protected. However, society is called
upon to attend to multiple values, and these do come into conflict with
privacy. The question hence arises which value ought to yield? Note that
framing the examination of privacy in this liberal communitarian way
differs from those who view privacy as a right, and leave it to others to
prove that any exceptions ought to be made, under which this right will
yield, and set very high the bar such proof must clear. Liberal communitarianism does not privilege the common good or privacy, and makes a
strong commitment to both the starting points for its deliberations.
The key question, which core value must yield under what conditions, cannot be addressed abstractly and summarily, by pointing to the
high value of privacy—or to that of security or of some other common
good. The question must be addressed within the given historical context
in which a particular society finds itself. In this context the first issue is
how to enable informal social controls to maintain the moral order,
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which in turns serves to minimize the coercive role of the state. This
often requires allowing a high level of visibility of personal conduct to
other members of the community, i.e. limiting social privacy. To put it in
popular terms, there are and there ought to be few protections against
gossip. It takes a village to prevent a crime.
To the extent that the state must be involved, four criteria have been
laid out to help sort out whether a particular society, in a particular period, has compelling public needs that require a re-triangulation of the
relations between privacy and the common good. Given that societies
often over-steer in one direction or the other, and their circumstances
change—such redirection is frequently needed. If the new needs cannot
be served by voluntary means—preference is best given to the least intrusive interventions by the state. And attention should be given to mitigating the side effects of such interventions.
To the extent that government agents are held accountable, and
oversight over their action is adequate, they can be granted more powers
and leeway. The more surveillance is itself under surveillance, the more
surveillance a society can tolerate. However, when one cannot rely on the
government itself to provide sufficient oversight, new public bodies are
needed.
The traditional distinction between the public and the private realm
is losing much of its value. One must increase privacy protections
against private agents, because—aside from violating privacy on their
own, often without any gain to anyone but to themselves—they also
share the information they garner, including very comprehensive dossiers, with the government. Hence all agents should be prohibited from
collecting sensitive information—and from using insensitive information
to ferret out that which is more sensitive—unless there is compelling public interest, the intrusion is minimized and the side effects are mitigated,
in both the private and the public realms. This last requirement entails a
major departure from prevailing legal traditions and public policy that in
liberal democracies restrain the state but poorly regulate the private
sector.
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